Torrey Seland
Volda University
College, Norway
Paper read at the SBL
Annual Meeting 2003
(Re)presentations
of violence in Philo
Introduction.
The issue of violence
and the Bible has come into focus for several reasons in recent years. In
reading the Bible, however, it is also important to see how other writers
and –as in our case – interpreters of the Biblical texts at the
beginning of our time, considered violence. One of these persons that
should be invited to speak is Philo of Alexandria. Living from ca. 10 BCE
to ca 50 CE made him a contemporary of both Jesus and Paul. Being an
author of an extensive number of commentaries on biblical books and issues
makes him an even more interesting personage of his time. A presentation
of readings from his texts should not be carried out, however, without
providing some considerations about Philo and the nature of the topic
studied. Hence some comments on my presuppositions in this regard.
Some
models and perspectives
When investigating the
prevalence of representations of violence[1] in the works of Philo, there are two sets of
presuppositions to clarify: First, what are we looking for; Secondly, who
was Philo, and what was his social location in the world of his time. Then
the major question can have a closer presentation: How did Philo deal with
the issue of violence?
What
is violence?
The issue of violence
is deeply embedded in the social structures of the time and culture
concerned, and any investigations of such a theme should make explicit the
applied concept, that is, how one defines the phenomenon of ‘violence.’
Recent studies emphasize that presentations of violence are closely
related to standpoint and social location. Hence presentations of
‘violence’ may be differently evaluated according to the position of
the reporters as, e.g., a perpetrator, a victim or a witness. Discussions
of (re)presentations of violence without such awareness of standpoint may
bring out some viewpoints, but will be hard to assess as to the value of
the inherent evaluations of the topic studied.
In a much cited book,
D. Riches defined ‘violence’ as “an act of physical hurt deemed
legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by (some) witnesses.”[2] In a more recent collection of articles following
up the stimulus set by the book of Riches, this definition is uphold, not
at least because of its “abstractness which allows for cross-cultural
comparability, and in its addressing the essential ambivalence <of
violence> as instrumental and expressive action.”[3]
B.J. Malina too has recently defined ‘violence’ in a similar way:
“Violence transgresses the limits of acceptable coercion; it is aimed at
harming another illegitimately.”[4]
Several aspects of determining the nature of violence are focused in these
definitions: first, the relation of violence to force and coercion;
secondly, its relation to current laws and social norms; and lastly the
relevance of possible diverging viewpoints stated by a perpetrator, victim
or witness.
First of all, one
should differentiate between coercion, violence and force.
Not all use of coercion is violence. Every society has some kinds of rules
set by the system to regulate the use of coercion, whether performed by
the regime or private individuals. In the following the term coercion is
used denoting “acts intended to harm others or their value possessions.’’[5] Such a definition includes a vast array of acts
from the slight and the subtle to the extensive and overt. But common to
all coercive acts is that they are intended to harm in one way or another.
What constitutes harm, however, may be further defined in light of the
particular societies studied, i.e., it is culturally dependent.[6]
Coercion is further
closely related to violence and force, but these latter terms represent
two different kinds of coercion: “Acts of coercion that violate the
limits within a particular community may be termed ‘violence,’ whereas
acceptable coercion may be called ‘force.’”[7]
Hence some coercion may be acceptable in light of a particular society’s
code of law, but the acceptable degree of coercion may be different from
community to community. The important element here is that outbreaks of
violence (as unacceptable coercion) do not signify the breakdown of law
and order or of politics, but politics, considered as all deliberate
efforts to control mutual interaction, determines which forms of coercion
are considered to be violent.
Secondly, the various
forms of violence may have strong expressive functions of meaning;
establishment violence is one of these, terrorism another. The ready use
of violence to maintain or defend the status quo is a form of behavior
here to be called ‘establishment violence’ or ‘vigilantism’.[8] In investigations of history of law the term
‘self-redress’ is often used for the kind of actions here termed
establishment violence. Furthermore, ‘self-redress’ or ‘self-help’
is often used denoting the oldest and most primary form of punishment
brought upon persons who were thought to deviate from the accepted norms
of their societies.[9]
By the establishment of greater formation of communities and the
development of a more ‘advanced’ form of jurisdiction,
‘self-redress’ was not immediately abolished or denied, but it
underwent some regulation. In the further development of law and
jurisdiction some remnants of the institution of self-redress were
retained as a right of self-defense in certain circumstances. But these
last-mentioned forms of what might also be called ‘regulated or
legalized self-help’ must be distinguished from the form of
‘self-redress’ proscribed in the political system of the societies
concerned, i.e., vigilantism.
Defined in this way,
self-redress is not something to be found only in old ‘primitive’
societies before the establishment of regular judicature. In communities
where the regular way of prosecuting non-conformers is hindered by some
higher authorities, as for example in occupied nations or in pariah groups,
or where conservative elements of the population consider the regime to be
too tolerant or ineffective, the only way to fulfill the demands of their
own law may be “to take the Law into their own hands.’’ Rosenbaum
and Sederberg differentiate between three forms of vigilantism according
to the kind of targets: crime-control vigilantism, social-group
vigilantism and regime-control vigilantism.[10]
Recent times have seen several cases of establishment violence or
vigilantism where conservative elements of the population considered their
values threatened by ‘modernizing’ attitudes, and
social-anthropological research has also focused on the occurrence of
killing by self-redress in societies relatively close to the present time.[11]
The Jews of both the
Diaspora and in the occupied land of Israel can be considered as having
lived in situations concerned with social frontiers. And as establishment
violence has been characterized as typical for what may be called a
frontier mentality, this model commends itself for a study of conflicts
among the first century Jews.
Accordingly, the issue
of ‘violence’ involves several aspects to be considered; it concerns
actions of coercion considered illegitimate by some (perpetrators, victims
or witnesses), it always have functions of meaning, and may be variously
categorized in relation to its expressive role.
Who
was Philo?
Philo belonged to a
rich and influential family in Alexandria. His brother Alexander
Lysimachus was “alabarch,’’ perhaps an office concerned with
administration of the paying of taxes and customs.[12]
Josephus says that Alexander “surpassed all his fellow citizens both in
ancestry and in wealth’’ (Ant. 20.100). Philo thus undoubtedly
belonged to the elite segment of the Jewish Alexandrian community.[13]
In Ant. 18.259 Josephus
comments on an Alexandrian delegation—headed by Philo—that was sent to
Rome to intercede for the Jews at emperor Gaius Caligula. Josephus here
presents Philo as “a man held in the highest honor (a)nh_r ta_ pa&nta e!ndocov),
brother of Alexander the alabarch, and no novice in philosophy’’ (filosofi/av
ou)k a!peirov).
It is also
obvious from Philo’s own writings that he had official positions in the
city, and his story of the delegation to Rome is told in his De Legatione.
Philo must also have
been influential as a writer.[14]
Not only did he write exegetical commentaries on the Pentateuch, i.e., the
Law of Moses, the Jewish constitution, but he also wrote philosophical
treatises, apologetic works and dealt with contemporary political issues.[15]
If I should venture to make a
comparison with our own world and time, I might conjecture that had he
lived today he would probably have been a learned professor or rabbi –
or both – with his own television program and website, commenting on
both political and religious issues of his time and world (cf. Ad Flaccum
and Legatio ). I do not consider him a solitary scholar, sitting in his
office writing theoretical expositions of the old scriptures, but read him
as one deeply engaged philosophically, politically and religiously in the
life and circumstances of his Jewish community. In fact, he was much of
an agitator of his view of Judaism both among his fellow-Jews and
neighboring non-Jews.[16]
Hence his works focused on both inter-mural and intra-mural aspects of
Jewish life in Alexandria.
With regard to the
social location of the members of the Jewish community he belonged to in
Alexandria, they were probably situated along various stages of the social
ladder with regard to wealth, but they did not in general belong to the
elite groups holding positions in the political and religious institutions
outside their own politeuma structures. I have suggested that the Jewish
communities in the Diaspora in some respects could be characterized as
representing a community type to be designated ‘pariah community.’[17] They represented minority groups, though in such
cities as Alexandria they might have constituted a considerable part of
the population. The presence of Jews in several parts of the Roman world
antedated that Empire by centuries; hence during our period they had long
been a part of the economic and social system of the Diaspora.
Nevertheless, in the Letter of Claudius to the Alexandrians (41 CE) he
stated that the Jews were living in a city “not their own.’’[18]
Thus, they were not then considered indigenous to their host country by
the Roman authorities. Philo relates that in Alexandria there were five
quarters, named after the first letters of the alphabet: “Two of these
are called Jewish because most of the Jews inhabit them’’ (Flacc. 55).
We know also that most Jews in Rome lived in a special sector of that city
(cf. Legatio 155). However, they did not comprise ghettos, for they
resided in various other parts of the city too. In some cities many Jews
gathered together, perhaps according to professional activities, as was
usual in such preindustrial cities.
According to Philo,
they considered Jerusalem as their mhtro&poliv,[19]
even though they might have belonged to families that had lived in the
Diaspora for several generations. It is also to be kept in mind that for
many the Diaspora situation was a provisional arrangement: one day all the
Jews of the Diaspora should return to Israel, their own land (see Praem. 164f,
and Deut. 30:1-5). On
the other hand, many Diaspora Jews might have considered their Diaspora
residence their ‘fatherland’ too. Hence, while some social aspects
demonstrate the pariah character of their existence, other points show
that this was not necessarily the only dominant character of their own
conceptions of their Diaspora life.
Furthermore, and very
important for our topic; the Jews had a socio-political organization that
was acknowledged by the Roman authorities. They had an institution with
its own constitution and administration, and through this they could
perform certain in-group functions, and also some of a juridical character.
These were limited, however, as the Jews lacked the right to impose
capital punishment, even though the Torah prescribed such measures in
several cases.[20] In
an agonistic culture as the first-century Mediterranean world, the
character of their Jewish community as a minority community, and the
limitations on their own jurisdiction are all aspects that are important
for understanding the (re)presentations of ‘violence’ in the works of
Philo.
Re)presentations
of violence in Philo’s works
(Re)presentations of
acts of ‘violence’ are thus dependent on several points of view. In
the following I will primarily use the works of Philo belonging to the
socalled Exposition and his historical works, investigating what they
might tell us about Philo’s views on ‘violence.’[21] However, in reading his works, it soon becomes
very evident here too that ‘violence’ cannot be studied as an abstract
phenomenon. It is always socially located, socially conditioned, and
socially understood. Hence in the following I will try to differentiate
between Philo as a victim/witness of anti-Jewish ‘violence’, and Philo
as a witness of intra-Jewish ‘violence.’
Philo
as a witness/victim of anti-Jewish ‘violence’
Several of the works of
Philo have an obvious apologetic agenda; among these are Hypothetica,
In Flaccum and De Legatione ad Gaium the most noticeable. In
the two last mentioned, Philo deals with contemporary political events
crucial for the existence and well-being of the Jewish community in
Alexandria at his time. Pivotal among the events dealt with are the pogrom
in Alexandria in 38 CE.
The pogrom was a result
of several political events and circumstances both on the imperial level
in Rome, and locally in Alexandria concerning the local Jewish rights. We
can not here discuss the historical questions concerning the chronology of
the particular events,[22]
nor the way Philo describes these issues in light of his symbolic and
theological universe,[23]
but present some comments on the ‘violence’ in the riots against the
Jews as described by Philo.
The riots of 38 CE, was
due to several factors: Among these, one the most crucial was the
political weakness of the then governor Flaccus. Due to the death of his
patron, the emperor Tiberius, he was political ineffective for some time.
The time before the re-establishment of the local governor’s ability of
authority was taken advantage of by some of his enemies, and exploited in
verbal and physical attacks against the Jews. When Gaius Caligula became
emperor, the conditions in Alexandria grew even worse. The attacks, when
first initiated, soon evolved into severe riots: The Jewish synagogues
were attacked and desecrated or burned down (Legat. 133-134), and the
governor was made to issue a proclamation that the Jews were “foreigners
and aliens” (Flacc. 54) in Alexandria. This was followed up by an
expulsion of the Jews from the various parts of the city into one section
alone, which thus soon was converted into a ghetto, “the first known
ghetto in the world”.[24]
As the anti-Jewish riots developed, the cruelty increased: Houses were
pillaged, many fled out of the city to the beaches (Legat. 124), and many
were publicly exposed and dishonored in several ways. Some were physically
attacked, mob-lynched, scourged, dragged through the market, some were
burned, others crucified (Legat. 130f; Flacc. 65ff). Finally, it seems to
have resulted in an attack by Flaccus on the pivotal institution of the
Jews, their senate or ‘gerousia’, their council of elders. The members
were scourged, some of them to death in a way which were utterly felt as a
humiliation to the Jews (Flacc. 75-85). Philo himself describes this as
“the height of harshness”; the elders were not scourged in the usual
way due to their status, but in the same ways as the native Egyptians,
that is, “they were treated like Egyptians of the meanest rank and
guilty of the greatest iniquities” (Flacc. 80).
Philo is eloquent in
his descriptions of the actions taken against the Jews, as well as when he
later describes the consequences that befell Flaccus the governor. After
Claudius had become the emperor in Rome, Flaccus was arrested, deprived of
his property, sentenced to banishment and exiled to one of the Aegean
islands, and finally killed by the Romans. Smallwood is right in stating
that Philo’s interest “in Flaccus’ fate is moral, not judicial.”[25] He is convinced that Flaccus agony was caused
“by his treatment of the Jews, whom in his craving for aggrandizement he
had resolved to exterminate utterly” (Flacc. 116). Philo ends his book
on Flaccus by stating that "it was the will of justice (di/kh) that the
butcheries which she brought on his single body should be as numerous as
the number of the Jews whom he unlawfully put to death” (Flacc. 189), and that Flaccus “thereby became an
undubitable proof that the help which God can give was not withdrawn from
the nation of the Jews” (Flacc 191).
How does Philo consider
the ‘violence’ exhibited in this pogrom? In this case Philo was an
observer, and as a part of the Jewish community in Alexandria, also a
victim. As might have been expected, he does not deal so much with the
enforcement of coercion displayed in the riots, as with the legal and
moral disgracement involved. This is evident throughout his narrative, but
most manifest in his descriptions of the dishonor conferred on the Jews
and especially on the council of elders. These features are quite
understandable in light of the culture at that time and place. Alexandria,
as well as the larger Mediterranean area, was part of an agonistic culture
in which values as honor and shame played inescapably roles. As in any
agonistic culture, coercion and even violence in various forms were
pervasive. This is also to be seen in his descriptions of both the pogrom
and the fate of Flaccus; the Jews suffered excessive and unjust violence,
Flaccus got what he - according to Philo - deserved; an extremely bloody
death.
In light of the model
presented here, the kind of coercion perpetrated against the Jews in the
pogrom should be termed establishment violence. Due to the social
progression of the Jews felt and feared by their native neighbors,
especially by the local citizens, the Jews were attacked in order to
reduce their influence and possibilities of social advancement. Back to
basics! And as far as the pogrom also was rather indiscriminate as to the
victims, the establishment violence could be further defined as a kind of
social group control vigilantism, or even vigilante terrorism.[26]
Philo
as a witness of intra-Jewish violence
If we then turn to what
we may find in the works of Philo about ‘violence’ n an intra-mural
Jewish context, it might be interesting to ask how he treats the many
narratives in the Hebrew Bible about excessive coercion, even violence,
against fellow-Jews. How does he treat the ‘violence’ recorded in the
Scriptures? Does he give voice to any criticism of the degree of coercion
exhibited? Or does he perhaps occasionally rather strengthen the coercive
or violent features of events recorded? Furthermore, as he applies the
legal matters of the Law of Moses to contemporary issues, how does he
actualize these laws? We shall present a few test cases of how he deals
with episodes recorded in the books of Moses, then we will try to
demonstrate how he in some cases even intensifies some of the legislation
of Moses in his contemporizing expositions.
Some
cases of ‘violence’ in the Hebrew Bible.
Being
aware of the danger of running into anachronistic readings of the works of
Philo, one might nevertheless take a point of departure in some texts that
modern readers often find rather repulsive in their use of coercion,
violence and force: We focus briefly on Philo’s representations of the
sacrifice of Isaac (Gen 22), the rape of Dinah (Gen 34), the slaughter of
the Levites (Exod 32), and the Phinehas episode of Num 25.
Philo has a major
exposition of the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen 22) in Abr 167-208, but
neither does he comment explicitly on the inherent ‘violence’ of the
story here, nor in his other scattered references to this episode (Somn.
1,195; Fug. 132; Congr. 43; et al.). He knows however, that there were
some “quarrelsome critics who misconstrue everything and . .
. do not think Abraham’s action great or wonderful, as we suppose
it to be” (Abr. 178). They level against Philo that many others have
offered their children in order to be redeemed from some danger. Hence
they do not see why the willingness to offer Isaac should be considered
special. It is not clear who these critics were, whether Jews or Gentiles.[27] M.
Niehoff argues that Philo are more sympathetic to the idea of child
sacrifice than both Josephus and the rabbis.[28]
Be that as it may, it is obvious from Philo’s exposition of Gen 22 that
the ‘violence’ as such did not bother him here; at least he does not
focus this aspect.
Philo has also just a
few comments on the rape of Dinah and the subsequent revenge of her
brothers (Gen 34) in Migr. 223 and Mut. 194. He here uses the story in a
highly allegorical exposition. Contrary to Gen 34:30 where Jacob is
reproaching his unmerciful sons, Philo are positive towards their action.
As the editors of the Loeb edition states in their footnote to Migr. 223,
Philo “takes great liberties with the story”, ignoring the seduction
and the circumcision of the
male persons in Sichem, but is led to be appraisive of Jacob’s sons. No
further comments on the excessiveness of the coercion involved are voiced
by Philo.
In Exod 32 we have the
story of the Israelites in the desert worshipping the golden calf.
After Moses came down from the mountain, he in his anger called upon those
who wanted to be on the Lord’s side, and the Levites rallied to him.
They were then told to “Put your sword on your side, each of you! Go
back and forth from gate to gate throughout the camp, and each of you kill
your brother, your friend, and your neighbor.” The
sons of Levi did as Moses commanded, and about three thousand of the
people fell on that day. For this, the Levites were later rewarded the
Priesthood.[29]
Philo returns several
times to this episode (see esp. Mos. 2,159ff;270ff; Spec. 1,79; 3,124f;
3,155; Ebr. 67f; Sacr. 130; Fug. 90). He uses very emphatic terms,
applauding the action taken by the Levites: “They were helt to have done
a truly religious deed, driven by “godly zeal” (Spec. 1,79), they
carried out a “righteous slaughter” (3,124), performing the “most
illustrious act of heroism that has ever been achieved” (3,126). But
most of all they are praised because they disregarded any family ties, and
championed the honor of God alone: They “acknowledged no love nor
kinship but God’s love” (3,126f; Mos. 2,273). The willingness to serve
God is considered by Philo to be the primary tie of affinity, and the love
of one’s neighbors or relatives is subordinated to this commitment.[30]
We find the same emphasis of Philo also in his version of Gen 22 in Abr.
67, and in other descriptions of how to relate to apostates: In Spec.
3,155b he states that “Those whom we call our kinsfolk
or within the circle of kinsmen our friends are turned into aliens
by their misconduct when they go astray; for agreement to practice justice
and every virtue makes a closer kinship than that of blood, and he who
abandons this enters his name in the list not only of strangers and
foreigners but of mortal enemies” (cp. Spec. 1,317-318).
We find similar
emphases in his use of the Phinehas-episode from Num 25.[31] The Phinehas episode is mentioned in eight
passages from Philo’s works, five in his allegorical works and three in
his Expositio.[32]
In the Torah (Num 25)
the sin of the people is depicted as both adultery and idolatry, the
former issue reported of Zimri though no offering by him is explicitly
stated. The issue of sexual sin made it easy for Philo to use the episode
in his expositions on the fight to be fought against pleasure, and this is
the explicit context of his use of the Phinehas episode in Leg. 3,242;
Post. 183; Mut. 108, and Mos. 1,301ff (cf. 1,263ff). It is also more or
less inherent in the other passages of Ebr. 73 and Conf. 57. This emphasis
colors Philo’s exposition of such elements in the story as the name
Phinehas, his spear, the womb of the woman and Phinehas’ reward. The
expositions of the Phinehas episode in these passages thus contain rather
extensive allegorizations, but Philo nevertheless keeps firmly in mind
the picture of Phinehas in Num 25 in his comments.
Among
the most interesting features of his expositions here are his
descriptions of Phinehas as driven by zh~lov,
a zh~lov
even characterized as a “zeal for God’’ (Post. 183) or “zeal of
God’’ (o( zhlw&sav to_n u(per qeou~ zh~lon,
Leg. 3,242). Not to be ignored is the comment Philo adds in Ebr. 74
showing that the historical situation is not denied in the allegorical
passages:
Surely
such a one must pass for a murderer in the judgement of the multitude (para_
polloi=v),
and be condemned by custom the woman-like, but in the judgement of God the
all-ruling Father he will be held worthy of laud and praise beyond
reckoning and of prizes that cannot be taken from him—two great and
sister prizes, peace and priesthood.
Philo’s use of the
Phinehas episode in the Expositio is given in his works Mos
1,301-304; Spec. 1,56-57 and Virt. 34ff. By some additions to the story as
recorded in Num. 25, Philo emphasizes the role of Zimri.
In both Philo’s Spec.
1,54-57 and Mos. 1,303f., as well as in some rabbinic texts, Phinehas’
action is given in highly positive terms; he was acting as a mediator
between God and men. This positive application of the Phinehas episode is
corroborated by the fact that the feature of the criticism of Phinehas
found in Phinehas traditions in Pseudo-Philo Biblical Antiquities 47:1 and
in some later rabbinic traditions, is absent in the works of Philo. His
use of the episode is positive and endorsing.
I admit the danger of
anachronistic readings of these texts when using them as evidence for
Philo’s views on ‘violence’. They nevertheless demonstrate how he in
his social world of Alexandria, and in the context of his symbolic
universe, used these cases from the Torah. And to understand him, we have
to familiarize ourselves to his contexts too. To Philo these texts
represented cases from the Law of God, and as such represented part of the
constitution of Israel, a people “living under the best of constitutions”
(Conf. 141). He finds this Law to be in accordance to nature, and
righteous and good. These aspects are also inherent in his presentation of
the importance of ius talionis (Spec. 3,181ff);[33]
the punishments prescribed has to resemble the crimes condemned (3,182):
Our
law exhorts us to equality when it ordains that the penalties inflicted on
offenders should correspond to their actions, that their property should
suffer if the wrongdoing affected their neighbour’s property, and their
bodies if the offence was a bodily injury, the penalty being determined
according to the limb, part or sense affected , while if his malice
extended to taking another’s life his own life should be the forfeit.
The ius talionis is
thus strongly upheld, though Philo is also aware of that the particular
circumstances of a crime has to be taken into consideration when meeting
out the punishments to be inflicted (3,183).
The love of God (see
above) and the willingness to serve God is to be the primary tie and focus
of affinity. It has been stated that Philo never quotes the OT injunction
of loving one’s neighbor as oneself (Lev 19:18b.34), nor does he seem to
allude to it in any of his works. His all-embracing emphasis is rather on
the love toward God: i.e., the qeofilh&v
aspect is emphasized.[34]
This is not correct. Philo uses Lev 19:34 in Spec. 1,51-53 and Virt.
102-104.[35]
The obligation to love one’s neighbors or relatives is, however,
restricted by Philo in several texts. As demonstrated above, Abraham is
praised for his disregard of family ties both in connection with his
departure form his father’s house (Abr. 67); in his willingness to
sacrifice Isaac (Abr. 167-199), and the Levites are similarly praised (Spec.
3,124f; Mos. 2,170-173 et al.). Instead of affirming here such ties of
friendship or family, Philo declares that there should be one tie of
affinity, the willingness to serve God, and that every word and deed
should promote the cause of piety, and “the honor of God, which is the
dissoluble bond of all affection which makes us one.” The same
willingness to disregard family ties is also emphasized in his exposition
of Deutr 13 on how to cope with false prophets (Spec. 1,315-318).
Cases
of establishment violence?
In another work I have
dealt with some texts in De Specialibus Legibus in which I find Philo
arguing for actions to be taken by way of ‘establishment violence’
against Jewish transgressors of the Law.[36]
I shall here comment further on two of these texts in light of our
particular topic; namely Spec. 1,54-57 and 1,315-318. For a fuller
treatment of these texts, I must refer to the work just mentioned.
Both texts are part of
Philo’s exposition of the two first commandments of the Decalogue
(1,12-345); the first deals with those who ‘betray the honor due to the
one God,’ the second deals with false prophets and family members
seducing into worshipping other gods.
Spec.
1,54-57.
Philo
states this case thus: “But if any members of the nation betray the
honor due to the One, they should suffer the most severe penalties.” And
concerning the actions to be taken against such transgressors, he says:
“And it is well that all who have a zeal for virtue should be permitted
to exact the penalties offhand and without no delay, without bringing the
offender before jury or council or any kind of magistrate at all.” Then
He legitimates this procedure further with a brief reference to the
Phinehas episode from Num 25 (“There is recorded in the Laws the example
of . . .”).
The crime described is
introduced by the pregnant expression “betray the honor due to the
One” (kaqufi/entai
th_n tou~ e(no_v timh&n).[37]
This should be read as a strong expression denoting shaming their God by
apostasizing. The direct object for the verb kaqufi/entai
in 1,54 is given as tou~
e(nov timh&n:
“the honor due to the One.’’ To understand the importance of this
aspect in the present text, it must be read in light of Philo’s emphasis
on the oneness of God and the honor due to him. To Philo, the honoring of
God is closely related to observance of the Law and to the worship of the
one true God. The gravest mistake a man can make is to fail to honor the
One, the only living God (Legat. 347), the creator of all things (Legat.
293). That God is the only truly existent God is stated in Philonic
expressions that function almost as formulas (see Spec. 1,313, 331; Virt.
34, 40, 102, 114; Praem. 123).
The description of the
measures to be taken against the culprits is first stated very briefly:
“they should suffer the utmost penalties’’ (tai=v a)nwta&tw timwri/aiv o)fei/lousi
kola&zesqai).
The expression is very short, but it is most probable that the punishment
it signifies is capital punishment. This interpretation can be supported
by several observations: First, by the expression tai=v
a)nwta&tw timwri/aiv
as used in other Philonic texts, then by the description of the practice
and legitimation which follow in 1,55-57, and lastly from the description
of the capital punishment to be inflicted on the transgressors of the five
first Commandments, as stated in Spec. 2:242ff.[38]
Our interpretation of
the expression tai=v a)nwta&tw timwri/aiv o)fei/lousi kola&zesqai
as an injunction to kill the transgressor on the spot is
strengthened by Philo’s outright denial of any need to consult
the courts or any officials concerned with regular trials. Instead, the
agents are to consider themselves as executing the functions usually
carried out in court procedures (Spec.1,55):
And
it is well that all who have a zeal for virtue should be permitted to
exact the penalties offhand and with no delay, without bringing the
offender before jury or councilor any kind of magistrate at all, and give
full scope to the feelings which possess them that hatred of evil and love
of God which urges them to inflict punishment without mercy on the
impious. They should think that the occasion has made them councillors,
jurymen, high sheriffs, members of assembly, accusers, witnesses, laws,
people, everything in fact, so that without fear or hindrance they may
champion religion in full security.
Thus,
the punishment suggested by Philo for betraying the honor due to the One
God is death. Its execution, furthermore, should not be given over to
those responsible for regular court procedures, but carried out on the
spot. When such gross transgressions were discovered ‘in flagrante,’
the situation itself would make the witnesses liable to perform all the
functions usually carried out by regular court procedures and
functionaries. Hence Philo here does not present the punishment to be
inflicted as a measure of disciplinary punishment, but—in light of the
categories of our model and from the viewpoint of official law—as
measures of ‘vigilantism.’ How these actions were to be carried out is
not, however, explicitly stated by Philo. Stoning might have been thought
of as the most regular means (cf. m Sanh. 9:6), but whatever means
available at the crucial moment might have been acceptable.
The persons to take
action against the transgressors are described in Spec. 1,55 thus: “And
it is well that all who have a zeal for virtue (a#pasi
toi=v zh~lon e!xousin a)reth~v)
should be permitted to exact the penalties offhand and with no delay’’
(cp. 1,316; 2,252-254). Then, having stated that they should not bring the
offender before any jury, etc., Philo characterizes the situation thus:
they should “give full scope to the feelings which possess them, that
hatred of evil and love of God which urge them to inflict punishment
without mercy on the impious’’ (a)lla_ tw|~ parasta&nti misoponh&rw| pa&qei kai fi/loqe/w|
kataxrh&sqai pro_v ta_v tw~n a)sebw~n a)paraith&touv kola&zeiv).
Important issues here are the “affective emphasis’’ of the agents
denoted and the question whether some particular groups are meant by these
descriptions.
The characterization in
the present passage, furthermore, receives a additional specification in
1,56-57, where the Phinehas episode is used as a legitimating example.
Phinehas is the great figure associated with zh~lov
in the history of Israel.[39] In several passages Philo too, associates him
with the performance of zh~lov
(cf. Leg. 3,242; Conf. 57; Post. 183; Mut. 108).
The “affective
emphasis’’ of this zh~lov, so typical in descriptions of ‘the Zealots’ in Palestine[40]
is indicated by several features as present here too. The expression nomi/santav
ktl
of 1,55 represents an aspect in some other comparable texts of Philo. In
Spec. 1,316 (see below) it is said that those who would rush to take
vengeance on the unholy seducer would do so kri/nontej
eu)agev to_ kat* au)tou~ fona~n (“deem it a religious duty to seek his death’’). A similar
statement is given in Spec. 3,96, which deals with the measures to be
taken against ma&goi
and farmakeutai/:
“And therefore it is right that even the most reasonable and
mild-tempered should seek the blood of these, that they should lose hardly
a moment in becoming their executioners, and should hold it a religious
duty to keep their punishment in their own hands and not commit it to
others’’ (kainomi/santav eu)ageei}nai to_ mh_ e(te/roiv th_n timwri/an e)pitre/pein a)ll* e(autoi=v). Similar sayings are also to be found in Philo’s
retelling of the Levites’ action in the desert (Spec. 3,26f) and of
Moses’ killing the Egyptian (Mos. 1,44). Accordingly, there are cases
where it is right to kill on the spot a violator of the Torah. And such an
action should be deemed holy, as “a religious duty’’ (Spec. 3,128).
These aspects surely point to features of “affective emphasis’’
among the agents thus described. Furthermore, in 1,55 this aspect is
described thus: They should “give full scope to the feelings which
possess them, that hatred of evil and love of God which urges them to
inflict punishment without mercy on the impious’’ (a)lla_ tw|~ parasta&nti misoponh&rw| pa&qei kaifiloqe/w|
kataxrh~sqai pro_v ta_v tw~n a)sebw~n a)paraith&touv kola&seiv).
Here this comes as an explanation of their zeal and is in accordance with
Spec. 4,14, where Philo says that “everyone who is inspired with zeal
for virtue (zh~lov a)reth~v), is severe of temper and absolutely implacable
against manstealers.’’ The “affective emphasis’’ of this zh~lov was thus well known to Philo. The same emotional
aspect is followed up by the injunction to exact the penalties “offhand
and with no delay’’[41]
and “without fear or hindrance’’ (Spec. 3,96), and by the statement
that the punishment is to be inflicted “without mercy’’ on the
impious.[42]
Hence we have here not only a text where Philo admonishes zealous persons
to take action, but one where he also explicitly points to their feelings
of anger and suggests a rapid and violent action on the spot.
The
question whether some particular groups are meant by such descriptions is
more difficult to decide. But texts as 1 Macc. and m Sanh 9:6 seem to
attest that violent zealous measures against some non-conformers to the
Torah was considered to have been carried out. As I comprehend these texts,
Philo—though living in a different time and place—gave injunctions to
similar vigilante behavior. The descriptions of the ‘zealots’ in Spec.
1,56f are rather close to those of m Sanh. 9,6. Both deal with
transgressions of the Torah; both concern measures not needing regular
court procedures; and both characterize the agents as “zealous’’.
According to J.-A. Morin, it is “tout à fait remarquable où l’exégète
alexandrin . . . décrit des zhlwtai/
qui ressemblent étrangement à ceux de la Mishna.’’[43] It may be remarkable, but it is hardly to be
denied.
Spec.
1,315-318.
According to our reading of this text, Philo here, by his
exposition of Deut 13:1ff., advocates zealotic self-redress or
establishment violence to be carried out against some seducers to apostasy,
taken in flagrante. The crime is described very closely to Deut 13:1ff.[44]
The most relevant
section concerning the way to cope with such seducing prophets, friends or
family members is 1,316b:
We
must punish him as a public and general enemy, taking little thought for
the ties which bind us to him: and we must send round a report of his
proposals to all lovers of piety, who will rush with a speed which brooks
no delay to take vengeance on the unholy man, and deem it a religious duty
to seek his death.
In
Deut. 13, the regulations on what is to be done with the seducers to
idolatry is given both after the description of the false prophet (Deut
13:6) and after the warning against family members (Deut 13:10).
Philo, however, presents his understanding of the measures first after his
description of the seductive family members. In addition he makes some
other important deviations in describing the measures to be taken.
In 317 Philo motivates
the recommended action by an elaboration of his understanding of the
really significant kinship (oi)keio&thv)
to be kept and retained even at the loss of relationship based on blood.
But preceding this he presents his understanding of the LXX expression a)nagge/llwn a)naggelei=v
(Deut 13:10). Philo’s interpretation of this issue seems to indicate
he is not thinking about punishment to be taken by the authorities,
especially not by Roman authorities, but rather about measures taken by
self-help on the spot.
Philo’s description
of the punishment to be inflicted upon the seducer is important for understanding
his view of the disruptive consequences of such seductive activities. The
seducer must be punished w(v dh&mion kai koino_n e)xqro&n;
”as
a public and general enemy.’’ He is to be treated as an enemy of the
Jewish community as he has incited his own folk to leave their ancestral
traditions of honoring the one and only God. Therefore, one must not
consider the incidental family ties (oi)keio&thtov)
that may exist as a hindrance to his punishment, but take his life as soon
as possible. This is most clearly borne out by what follows in the text of
Philo.
Philo has no explicit
injunctions as to how the seducer is to be killed. It is not
explicitly stated in the text of the Torah how the false prophet is to be
killed (Deut 13:6), but only that he is to be done away with (kai
a)faniei=j to_n ponhro_n e)c u(mw~n au)tw~n). The text of Deut 13:11, however, clearly prescribes the punishment of
stoning for the other seducers (cf. the expression kai
liqobolh&sousin au)to_n e)n li/qoij,
kai
a)poqanei=tai,
cf. also Deut 17:2ff where stoning is presented as the punishment for
idolatry).
The relevant part of
Spec. 1,315-318, dealing with the agents, can be translated thus (1,316c):
.
. . we must punish him as a public and general enemy, taking little
thought for the ties which bind us to him: and we must send round a report
of his proposals to all lovers of piety (pa~si
toi=j eu)sebei/aj e)rastai=j),
who will rush with a speed which brooks no delay to take vengeance on the
unholy man, and deem it a religious duty to seek his death.
The
text used as basis here is Deut 13:6ff, especially v. 10, the latter which
in its Septuagintal form reads: a)nagge/llwn
a)naggelei=v peri au)tou~,
ai(
xei=re/v sou e!sontai e)p* au)to_n e)n prw&toiv a)poktei=nai au)to&n,
kai
ai( xei=rev panto_v tou~ laou~ e)p* e)sxa&tw|, kai liqobolh&sousin au)to_n e)n li/qoiv,
kai a)poqanei=tai.
Philo does not mention the stoning, and his exposition of how the
punishment is to be carried out seems to be more dependent upon his
understanding of the Greek LXX expression a)nagge/llwn
a)naggelei=j.
Philo’s interpretation of this expression seems to indicate that he is
not thinking about punishment taken by the authorities, especially not by
the Roman authorities, but rather about measures taken on the spot.
The most natural
interpretation of the Masoretic text and the translation of the LXX is to
take the OT expression as an injunction to report the seducer to the
authorities (cf. Deut 17:2ff). But in Philo the relevant expression a)nagge/llwn
a)naggelei=v has
been changed to diaggelte/on pa~si toi=v eu)sebei/av e)rastai=v,
who are then supposed to take immediate action. There is no good reason to
interpret this as a description of the authorities. The expression eu)sebei/av e)rastai=v
is found only here and in Virt. 218, the latter being a description of
Abraham striving for virtue. It may be more helpful to compare the
expression concerned here with Spec. 1,54, where the true adherents of the
Mosaic constitution are described as belonging to the ta&cin
eu)sebei/av kai o(sio&thtov and even with those described there as having “zeal for virtue.’’
Its significance may be illuminated by reference to the action taken by
Phinehas against the Midianites, an action Philo describes as being a
battle for eu)sebei/av
kai o(sio&thtov
(Mos. 1,307) and, further, the Levites’ actions taken against their
kinsmen after the episode with the golden calf in the desert (Spec. 1,79;
3,127; Mos. 2,173.274). This last proposal of mine is strengthened by the
fact that the expression kri/nontev
eu)agev (1,316c)
or similar formulations are especially associated by Philo with the action
of taking reprisals against apostates or idolaters. In Spec. 1,79 it is
said that the Levites who were thus “carrying to the end their
championship of piety (u(per
eu)sebei/av a)gw~nav)
were held to have done a truly religious deed’’ (eu)agev
e!docan e!rgon ei)rga&sqai,
cf. also Spec. 1,96 and Mos.
1,44).
Philo, then, does not
have the authorities in mind as subjects for the measures to be taken
against the seducers, but his injunction is to be understood as an
admonition to all lovers of piety to kill the seducer, keeping the
execution in their own hands. Hence the measures to be taken should not be
considered as official disciplinary measures carried out by the legal
authorities, but as measures of violence of the kind here categorized as
establishment violence. Philo himself legitimates this thus (Spec.
1,317-318):
For
we should have one tie of affinity (oi)keio&thv),
one accepted sign of goodwill, namely the willingness to serve God and
that our every word and deed promotes the cause of piety. But as for these
kinships (sugge/neiai),
as we call them, which have come down from our ancestors and are based on
blood-relationship, or those derived from intermarriage or other similar
causes, let them all be cast aside if they do not seek earnestly the same
goal, namely the honor of God, which is the indissoluble bond of all the
affection which makes us one.
For those who are so minded will receive in exchange kinships of
greater dignity and sanctity. This promise of mine is confirmed by the law,
where it says that they who do “what is pleasing’’ to nature and
what is “good’’ are sons of God. For it says, “Ye are sons to your
Lord God,’’ clearly meaning that He will think it fit to protect and
provide for you as would a father. And how much this watchful care will
exceed that of men is measured, believe me, by the surpassing excellence
of Him who bestows it.
Theoretical
or practical admonitions?
Are there then no
mitigating aspects in Philo’s texts on the use of coercion, violence and
force? Is he always a stern zealot-like Torah-observing Jew who knows no
compromises in his actualizing comments and expositions of the Law? Or is
he only dealing with theoretical expositions? If not, how can Philo, the
apologet, be harmonized with these stern expositions of the Torah? These
problems may partly be due to the fact that Philo is never in these texts
dealing with the phenomena of ‘violence’ as such. On the other hand, a
closer reading of his texts may reveal some compromising attitudes. We
admit they are not many, but shall point briefly to three aspects; the
role of allegory in some of his expositions, the issue of philantropia,
and his awareness of the still depending eschatological realization
of the perfect.
Philo’s writings
testify to the existence of several groups, or rather tendencies, within
the Alexandrian communities, concerning the interpretations of the Hebrew
scriptures. Most important here are the socalled literalists and the
allegorizers. These again may be further divided into faithful literalists
or allegorizers, and unfaithful literalists or allegorizers. And there are
some that use both approaches.[45]
According to Migr 89-93, Philo upheld both a literal and an allegorical
reading of the Torah. To him they belong together as body and soul. He may,
however, nevertheless occasionally prefer an allegorical interpretation
(Det. 95; 167), especially in order to avoid anthropomorphic
understandings of God. Sometimes he may offer both literal and allegorical
interpretations without making reservations or preferences concerning the
one or the other (e.g., in his De Abrahamo).
In Spec. 4,173-180 he
offers both kinds of interpretations, both it looks like he himself here
prefers the allegorical. The text deals with the punishment to be
inflicted upon a woman who in a upheated situation of conflict caught hold
of the genitals of a male opponent (Deut 25:11-12). According to a literal
reading of the Torah, her hand is to be cut off. Philo, however, seems to
find this to be too far-going, and introduces an allegorical
interpretation offered by some who “think that most of the contents of
the law-book are outwards symbols of hidden truths” (4,178), and he even
adds another allegorical exposition of himself (4,180). Philo does not
explicitly present this because of the cruelty of the literal reading, but
as one he has “heard from highly gifted men” (4,178).
Furthermore, in his
treatise on The Virtues (De Virtutibus), section 50-174, he deals with the
human aspect of the Mosaic law, with the filanqrwpi/a.
Here Philo is highly apologetic, and tries to argue against accusations of
the Jewish law as being misanthropic.[46]
He points to the willingness of the Law to accept proselytes,
drawing upon Lev 19:34 (Virt. 102-104), and he adds the laws concerning
the treatment of enemies in wartime (Virt. 109-115)
as examples and proof of their filanqrwpi/a.
But in a passage to which I have found no true parallel in his works, he
admits that the conditions envisaged by Moses the lawgiver, are still a
part of the eschatological fulfillment to come (Virt. 119-120):
This
is what our most holy prophet through all his regulations especially
desires to create, unanimity, neighbourliness, fellowship, reciprocity of
feeling, whereby houses and cities and nations and countries and the whole
human race may advance to supreme happiness. Hitherto, indeed, these
things live only in our prayers, but they will, I am convinced, become
facts beyond all dispute, if God, even as he gives us the yearly fruits,
grants that the virtues should bear abundantly.
But I have to admit;
these features are very rare in Philo’s expositions. Philo is an
expositor of the Law of God; he does not focus here on the issue of
‘violence’ as such, but on the role of the Law in establishing and
confirming the people as the people of God, and the promotion of the honor
of God.
Finally, this last
question remains: Did Philo really support such zealotic and ‘violent’
attitudes and actions as discussed above? Is it really plausible that the
‘historical Philo’ supported ‘establishment violence’? These are
much-discussed questions.[47]
Any answer should at least consider the following aspects: As we nowhere
have a report in Philo’s works of actual cases of Jewish
intra-mural establishment violence being carried out, we have no such
evidence to argue from. And we do not have any other sources witnessing
that Philo engaged in some ways in such actions. What we have, however,
are his discussions of such capital cases as the texts presented above (see
also Spec. 2,252-254).
But then one should
also pay attention to some other aspects. Philo apparently knew about
zealous persons being present in Alexandria. In Spec. 2,253 he presupposes
the presence of “thousands . . . full of zeal for the laws, strictest
guardians of the ancestral institutions, merciless to those who do
anything to subvert them.” In spite of the obvious rhetorical
exaggerations in the expression (‘thousands..’), Philo obviously
expected the interference of such persons as a real possibility (cp. here
also 1,55; 1,316b; 4,7-10). Furthermore, according to Spec. 2,252-254 and
its parallel Spec. 2,27-28, Philo knew about two different punishments for
the crime of perjury: the lash or death. More importantly, however, Philo
explicitly states that he favors the more strict: death (Spec. 2,252, cf.
2,27). In Spec. 2,28 he characterizes those favoring death as “the
better-kind whose piety is extra-fervent.’’ This characterization
should then be read as an implicit self-characterization.
Philo can thus be read
as giving expositions of the Torah, supporting actions on the spot against
violators of the Law taken ‘in flagrante’. Arguments against such
interpretations are not credibly supported by assertions as “it is
difficult to believe that a philosopher and ethical teacher, as Philo was,
would have justified any practice of mob killing or mob violence.’’[48] Neither should the actions argued for by Philo
be classified by negative expressions like ‘mob killing’ or ‘mob
violence’ nor should sweeping propositions of what ‘a philosopher’
could propagate be used.[49] G. Alon has suggested, furthermore, that Spec.
1,54 attests that Philo here reveals his knowledge of an ancient Halakha
which was suppressed in later rabbinic traditions, a Halakha “which was
acted upon in Eretz-Israel and in the Diaspora in Philo’s days.’’[50]
He further tries to substantiate his case by pointing to m Sanh. 9.6.[51]
Hence we can conclude:
Though we have no sources from Philo available that explicitly record
actual cases of establishment violence, we have nevertheless his
expositions of cases of gross non-conformity to the Torah in which he
argues for coercive actions to be taken on the spot. He legitimates his
expositions by drawing upon traditions of the great hero Phinehas, and he
admonishes the agents to carry out the counter-measures quite
independently of any decision of court. In so far as this was contrary to
the jurisdiction granted to the Jews in Alexandria, his expositions dealt
with here may very well be taken both then and now as evidence for an
endorsing attitude to what should be termed ‘etablishment violence.’
Philo is thus a witness of a trajectory of zealotic ‘violence’ that
was in force not only in Palestine, but also in the Diaspora. This
tradition of ‘violent’ zeal became crucial for both Jews and
Christians and their interrelationships in the first century CE.[52]
Summary
We summarize the main
arguments of our discussion on (re)presentations of ‘violence’ in the
works of Philo thus:
- Philo was a member of
the elite sectors of the Jewish community in Alexandria, writing
voluminous works in which he commented on biblical books and contemporary
problems and issues.
- the Jewish community
in Alexandria had an institution of their own called ‘politeuma’, but
they nevertheless were not granted the right of carrying out death
penalties, even though such punishments were described and prescribed in
their own law, the Torah of Moses.
-
in his expositions, Philo very seldom explicitly argued against the
laws laid down in the Torah on capital punishments; however, he
occasionally strengthened the measures of the Torah (Spec. 1,54-57;
1,315-318), and might sometimes even argue for death penalty in cases
where no such measures were given in the Torah (e.g., Spec. 2,252-252 on
perjury).
- Philo adhered to, and
thus confirmed, the rule of ius talionis of the Torah, arguing that the
penalties inflicted should correspond to the actions; ‘an eye for an eye’.
- pivotal value in
upholding the Law and its standards were the honor due to the one God;
even ties of kinship were subordinated to this commitment. Several
examples from the Torah were used by Philo in arguing this point, the
Levites being a major example.
- in several cases
Philo could adduce the value of zeal for God as a legitimating aspect for
taking actions on the spot against transgressors of the Torah, especially
when they were taken ‘in flagrante.’ Phinehas was the primary role
model in this regard.
- if the term
‘violence’ is replaced by coercion, ‘violence’ can be
defined as ‘illegiti-mate coercion’, and ‘legitimate coercion’ as
‘force.’ In light of the Roman laws, the actions of the pogrom in 38
CE should be termed social group control vigilantism (establishment
violence). In light of the Roman laws Jewish actions on the spot against
their own culprits might be labelled establishment violence too, i.e.,
illegitimate coercion in defence of status quo of the Jewish law. In light
of the Torah, however, such actions were to be considered legitimate
coercion (though carried out in an illegitimate way), hence ‘force.’
[1]. The
issues focused in both this SBL session, and the former last year, are
‘questions of intra-religious violence, that is Jews against Jews
and/or Christians against Christians’ (formulation from the invitation
letter to participate). Hence I will not deal with the role of violence
in, e.g., situations of war,
but deal with various forms of inter- and intra-group conflicts as
presented by Philo.
[2]. D.
Riches, “The Phenomenon of Violence,” in The Anthropology of
Violence, edited by David Riches (Oxford, 1986), 8.
[3]. Ingo
W. Schröder and Bettina E. Schmidt, “Introduction: Violent
Imaginaries and Violent Practices,” in Anthropology of Violence and
Conflict, edited by Ingo W. Schröder and Bettina E. Schmidt
(London: Routledge, 2001), 4.
[4]. See
Bruce J. Malina, The Social Gospel of Jesus: The Kingdom of God in
mediterranean Perspective (Minneapolis, Mn: Fortress Press, 2001), 42.
[5]. Peter
C. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality (Englewoods
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), 11.
[6]. Sederberg,
Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality, 14–15.
[7]. Sederberg,
Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality, 13.
[8].
Cf. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and Reality, 60ff. H.J. Rosenbaum and P.C. Sederberg, “Vigilantism: An
Analysis of Establishment Violence,” in Vigilante Politics, eds
H.J. Rosenbaum and P.C. Sederberg (Philadelphia, 1976), 3–29.
‘Terrorism’ will not be much focused here. Sederberg understands it
as “a coercive tactic used by the contending sides of a political
struggle that deliberately violates . . . two rules of war.
Noncombatants are the targets of terrorism, and the means chosen to
destroy these targets are relatively indiscriminate.” (Terrorist
Myths, 31.
[9].
Cf. B. Cohen, “Self-Help
in Jewish and Roman Law,” Revue Internationale Des Droits de
l’Antiquité 3 (1955) 107: ‘’A system of self-redress, in the
form of private vengeance preceded everywhere the establishment of a
regular judicature.’’ On
this issue in the ancient Greek and Roman world, see further K. Latte,
“Beiträge zum griechischen Strafrecht,” in Zur griechischen
Rechtsgeschichte, edited by E. Berneker, Wege der Forschung 45
(Darmstadt, 1968), 262–314 and R. Köstler, “Die homerische
Rechts- und Staatsordnung,” in Zur Griechischen Rechtsgeschichte,
in Zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte, edited by E. Berneker, Wege
der Forschung 45 (Darmstadt, 1968), 172–95.
[10].
Cf. Rosenbaum, H.J. and Sederberg, P.C., “Vigilantism: An Analysis of
Establishment Violence,” 3–29.
[11]. H.Jon.
Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sederberg, Vigilante Politics
(Pennsylvania, 1976).
[12].
Cf. the comments in Josephus (LCL) to Ant. 18:159.
[13]. See
also my summary in Torrey Seland, Establishment Violence in Philo
& Luke: A Study of Non-Conformity to the Torah & Jewish
Vigilante Reactions, in Establishment Violence, Biblical
Interpretation Series 15 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 82–93, and
now also Peder Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, An Exegete for His Time,
Supplements to Novum Testamentum 86 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 14–26.
[14]. About
40 of his works are still extant, but indications in his own works as
well as remarks by some of the so-called church fathers suggest that his
works must have consisted of at least 20 more titles.
[15]. For
a more comprehensive presentation of Philo’s works, see Borgen, Philo
of Alexandria, An Exegete for His Time.
[16]. Cf.
here also Peder Borgen (Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria
A Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research Since World War
II,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 21,1 :
Geschichte und Kultur Roms Im Spiegel der Neueren Forschung. 2, Principat. Religion: [Hellenistisches Judentum in Römischer Zeit:
Philon und Josephus],
edited by Wolfgang Haase [Berlin, 1984], 98–154) who states that
“Philo’s intention is to conquer the surrounding culture
ideologically by claiming that whatever good there is has its source in
Scripture and thus belonged to the Jewish nation and its heritage. In
this way Philo represents the dynamic and offensive movement of the Jews
who infiltrated the environment of the alexandrian citizens around the
gymnasium . . .”(151).
[17]. Seland,
Establishment Violence
in Philo & Luke, 89–93.
[18].
For the text of this letter, see H. I. Bell, Jews and Christians in
Egypt (Westport, 1924), 29.
[19].
For the significance of this term, see Y. Amir, Die hellenistische
Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandria (Neukirchen-Vluyn,
1983), 52ff.
[20].
That the Jews did not have the rights of capital punishment is scarcely
to be doubted. See J. Juster, Les Juifs dans l’Empire Romain: Leurs
condition juridique économique et sociale Two
volumes (Paris, 1914), II, 156ff. Juster adds, however (p.
157): ‘’Cependant, les Juifs avaient adopté la pratique du lynchage
dans les cas ou un des leurs commettait quelque attentat grave contre la
religion juive.’’ Cf. E. R.
Goodenough, The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt:,
reprint, 1929 (Amsterdam <New Haven>, 1969), 25: ‘’That
Jews ever had the formal and official right in Alexandria, especially
under Roman rule, to execute sentence of death is most unlikely.’’
Goodenough’s own solution is, however, that this ‘’by no means
prevents the conclusion that the Jewish courts could sentence to death
subject to the approval of the Roman ruler, just as was done in the case
of Jesus . . . .’’ Cf.
pp. 253ff. This
theory is hardly tenable, and in any case impossible to prove. See my
discussion in Seland, Establishment
Violence in Philo & Luke, 17–42. See also
Taubenschlag R, The Law
of Greco-Roman Egypt in Light of the Papyri 332 BC-640 AD (Warszaw,
1955), 372: ‘’In the Roman period the highest jurisdiction in
all the land, civil and criminal...belonged to the prefect. He was also
invested with ius gladii.’’
[21]. For
the sake of convenience I use the term ‘violence’ in inverted commas
as the general term, but the reader should remember my definition
presented above.
[22]. See
here E.M. Smallwood, The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to
Diocletian, Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity 20 (Leiden, 1981), 235–42,
and now especially Pieter Willem van der Horst, Philo’s Flaccus:
The First Pogrom : Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Philo
of Alexandria Commentary Series, V. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
[23]. On
these aspects, se e.g., Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, An Exegete for
His Time, 176–93.
[24]. Smallwood,
The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian, 240.
[25]. Smallwood,
The Jews Under Roman Rule: From Pompey to Diocletian, 241–42.
[26]. See
further on this Sederberg, Terrorist Myths: Illusion, Rhetoric and
Reality, 60–62.
[27]. Niehoff
finds them to be Jewish opponents (Maren Niehoff, Philo on Jewish
Identity and Culture, Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism 86 [Tübingen:
J.C.B. Mohr, 2001], 173), while Feldman thinks they were
“non-Jews who condemned the Jews for misanthropy” (Louis H. Feldman,
“Philo’s Version of the ‘Aqedah,’” in The Studia Philonica
Annual. Studies in Hellenistic Judaism XIV 2002, vol. 335,
edited by David T. Runia and Gregory E. Sterling, Brown Judaic Studies [LProvidence,
Ri: Brown University, 2002], 66–86).
[28]. Niehoff,
Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture, 174.
[29]. For
the further exposition of Exodus 32, see B. S. Childs, Exodus: A
Commentary, Old Testament Library (London, 1977), 553–81.
[30]. See
further on this Seland, Establishment
Violence in Philo & Luke, 155–58.
[31]. Seland,
Establishment Violence
in Philo & Luke, 132–36; Louis H. Feldman, “The
Portrayal of Phinehas by Philo, Pseudo-Philo and Josephus,” Jewish
Quarterly Review 92 (2002): 315–45.
[32].
In the allegorical writings, Leg. 3,:242; Post. 182; Ebr. 73; Conf. 57;
Mut. 108; in the Expositio, Mos. 1,301; Spec. 1,56-57; Virt. 34ff (Phinehas
is not explicitly mentioned in the last). In the allegorical writings
Philo uses the Phinehas episode in various contexts, but that of the
fight against pleasure is the most prominent, and he gives allegorical
explanations for several aspects of Phinehas and his action.
[33]. Cf.
here Exod 21:24; Lev 24:19-21; Deut 19:21.
[34]. A.
Nissen, Gott und der Nächste im antiken Judentum,
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 15 (Tübingen,
1974), 304f.
[35]. Peder
Borgen, “The Golden Rule, with Emphasis on Its Usage in the
Gospels,” in Paul Preaches Circumcision and Pleases Men
(Trondheim: Tapir, 1983), 99–114.
[36]. See
here Seland, Establishment Violence
in Philo & Luke, esp. pp. 103-181.
[37].
Kaqufi/entai,
pres. med. of kaqufi/emi
is here used transitively like active. It is to be found only here and
in Spec. 3,61 among the works of Philo. Liddell and Scott lexicalize
it as having the meaning of ‘’to give up, surrender treacherously.’
[38]. See
further on this in Seland, Establishment
Violence in Philo & Luke, 122–25.
[39]. Cf.
Martin Hengel, The Zealots: Investigations Into the Jewish Freedom
Movement in the Period from Herod I Until 70 A.D., translated by
David Smith (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1989), and my Seland, Establishment
Violence in Philo & Luke, 42–72.126–36.
[40]. Hengel,
The Zealots, 62.
[41].
See the expression
e)k xeiro&v
(‘’offhand’’) as an expression denoting killing on the spot. In
Spec. 3,91 and 4,10 Philo uses
au)toxeiri/a
(“with his own hand’’). But this could as well be translated “on
the spot’’ or “offhand.’’ Cf. also Ebr. 66; Mos. 1,303. 308;
Spec. 3,96.
[42]. The
expression here translated “without mercy,’’ the Greek term a)paraith&touv,
meaning “inexorable,’’ “inevitable,’’ not to be turned away
with prayer,’’ signifies the absence of mercy in several
descriptions of punishment for specific severe crimes. See Legat. 305;
Ebr. 3.135 on the case of priests entering the holy of holies, Legat.
212 on Gentiles entering the Temple, Spec. 3,76 on sexual intercourse
with a betrothed girl and 4,19 on manstealers. Cf. further on those
imitating Phinehas at Sittim (Num. 25): Mos. 1,303, on the anger of
Gaius Caligula: Legat. 192 and 244, and lastly of the wrath of God: Gig.
47; Immut. 48.68; Ebr. 116.
[43]. J.
A. Morin, “Les deux derniers des douze: Simon le zélote et Judas
Isakariôth,” Revue Biblique 80 (1975): 340–41. The
Mishnaic text which Morin has in mind is m Sanh. 9:6. Cf. ibid., p. 340.
[44]. The
texts of Philo runs thus: “Further, if anyone cloaking himself under
the name and guise of aprophet and claiming to be possessed by
inspiration (sxh~ma
profhtei/aj u(podu&j,
e)nqousia~n
kai kate/xesqai dokw~n)
lead us on to the worship of the gods recognized in the different cities,
we ought not to listen to him and be deceived by the name of prophet.
For such a one is no prophet, but an impostor, (go&hj ga_r a)ll* ou) profh&thj e)stin o(
toiou~toj)
since his oracles are falsehoods invented by himself. And if a brother
or son or daughter or wife or a housemate or a friend, however true, or
anyone else who seems to be kindly disposed, urge us to a like course,
bidding us fraternize with the multitude, (sunasmeni/zein toi=j polloi=j) resort to their temples, and join in their libations and sacrifices, we
must punish him as a public and general enemy, taking little thought for
the ties which bind us to him.”
[45]. See
further on these issues some recent articles as e.g., D.M. Hay,
“Philo’s References to Other Allegorists,” Studia Philonica 6
(1979–80); David M. Hay, “Defining Allegory in Philo’s Exegetical
World,” in Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 1994,
edited by Eugene H. Lovering (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1994), 55–68.
[46]. Cf.
on this section Peder Borgen, “Philantropia in Philo’s Writings.
Some Observations,” in Biblical and Humane. Festschrift for John
Priest, edited by Linda Bennett Elder, David L. Barr, and Elizabeth
Struthers Malbon (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1996), 173–88;
Borgen, Philo of Alexandria, An Exegete for His Time, 243–60.
[47]. See
my review of the history of such questions in Seland, Establishment
Violence in Philo & Luke, 17–42.
[48]. N.
Bentwich, “’Philo as Jurist ‘,” Jewish Quarterly Review 21
(1931): 154.
[49]. Cf.
the statements by Rosenbaum, H.J. and Sederberg, P.C., “Vigilantism:
An Analysis of Establishment Violence,” 25, that “vigilante
organisations seem to be composed of members from all segments of
society.”
[50]. G.
Alon, “On Philo’s Halakha,” in The Jews, Judaism and the
Classical World, by G. Alon (Jerusalem, 1977), 89–132.
[51].
See also Jub. 30:7; 30:14-15 and b Sanh. 8b, 80b. and m Sanh. 4,4.
[52]. See
e.g., Torrey Seland, “Once More - The Hellenists, Hebrews and Stephen.
Conflict and Conflict Management in Acts 6–7,” in Recruitment,
Conquest, and Conflict. Strategies in Judaism, Early Christianity, and
the Greco-Roman World, edited by Peder Borgen, Vernon K. Robbins,
and David B. Gowler, Emory Studies in Early Christianity (Atlanta,
Georgia: Scholars Press, 1998), 169–207; L.W. Hurtado, “Pre-70
CE Jewish Opposition to Christ-Devotion,” Journal of Theological
Studies 50 (1999): 35–58; Torrey Seland, “Saul of
Tarsus and Early Zealotism. Reading Gal 1.13–14 in Light of Philo’s
Writings,” Biblica 83 (2002): 449–71.